One should consider Nietzsche’s the will to power (Germander Wille zur Macht) is a prominent concept in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The will to power describes what Nietzsche may have believed to be the main driving force in humans – achievement, ambition, and the striving to reach the highest possible position in life. These are all manifestations of the will to power.

 Each form of life has a particular constitution, with its instincts having different strengths, such that certain conditions will favour its form of life. This brings different types of life into conflict with each other, as each wants different conditions to prevail: ‘life itself in its essence means appropriating, injuring, overpowering those who are foreign and weaker’, though this language suggests that such activity is immoral, when it is simply a function of being alive.


That the instinctual life of human beings is the will to power – to evaluative claims about the new philosophers. But what is natural is not necessarily what is good, or again, we cannot infer from how things are to how things should be. Just because life is the will to power does not make the will to power a standard of what should be valued. IN DJT the Ubermensch, the will to power is a will to political power.


Nietzsche’s affirmation that “God is dead”, mirrors DJT in that he is GOD. . Nietzsche distinguishes and DJT affirms that between two types of morality: the “master morality” and the “slave morality”. The first is applicable to the leaders of society, who create their own values for themselves. The “slave morality” is applicable to the herd and according to its standards the behaviour of masters is accounted as evil. But masters, are subject to their own principles, different to the norms enacted for the herd that favour mediocrity and prevent the development of higher-level persons: the true leaders.


A passage from one of Nietzsche’s works is appropriate as a description of DJT attitudes in life:

“For believe me- the secret of realising the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment of existence is to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of the Vesuvius! Send your ships out into uncharted seas! Live in conflict with your equals and
with yourselves! Be robbers and ravagers as long as you cannot be rulers or owners, you men of knowledge!


Alexis Papazoglou, a philosophy expert at Royal Holloway, analyses what’s happening in the so-called post-truth era. He explains that philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 – 1900) saw the post-truth Trump era a long way off. The philosophy lecturer underscores how it’s more important than ever to actively seek out alternative views to sense-check our understanding of truth, which is challenging as we live in our algorithm-induced information echo chambers. That requires a sophisticated reflective approach to making sense of the world, yet most people aren’t aware of the social media subtleties that are making a dramatic impact on life as we know it. Papazoglou’s article is a reminder that we should all expect more post-truth shocks, wherever we are in the world. – Jackie Cameron


I, Cristoph De Caermichael predicted TRUMPERIKA long before he decided. I was acutely aware of the USA zeitgeist and that we, the world was heading to war. A war that would only arrive if DJT was President of the USA.

 Trump is the will of the commoner represented, just as an awful populist , he appeals to the most plebeian aspects of the people, has no real education or self control, he is a businessman and not a great one at that. To compare Trump to the Ubermensch is to compare a slug to an eagle,  he pretends to be strong by being uncontrolled, the more empty you are the more noisy you have to be.

 “One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship.” 
― George Orwell1984

At this moment the #1 cause of Terrorism is President Donald J.Trump.  This is a man caught up in his own demigod myth. And like Icarus he flown too close to the Sun. And we all no what happenned to Icarus. As I was doing my little video and watched the candle flames – I was transported to another place and time. And this was the vision I saw.  I froze looked at the beautiful waters of the Sea of Andaman and looked back again. As this is too deep to ponder. Something is going to happen  that is all I know.


The Tragedy of terrorism struck again. But it was relatively Sotto Voce. The Istanbul tragedy was more of a whisper, compared to the banshee that was Paris and Brussels.

The oddity continues in that it was deemed – eyesys (ISIS) but yet that whisper was faint and hollow. Could it be a wanna be ?- seeking to keep the voice of eyesys – in the worlds mind, yet not be truly ISIS. Muslim terrorist Muslim  victims? The world does not mourn, in as much as it did for the west. Do Muslim lives matter? What was reprinted and heralded was the vivid image of Paris.

  • Eyesys feels desperate. As these acts of terror are the acts of depravity, of desperation and of evil for the sake of evil. In any way its so sad. Please pray and have a moment of silence for PEACE.

Why the Dhaka terror attack is shockingly unsurprising—and a warning for India

A banner for the victims of the bombings reads ” I am Brussels” at the Place de la Bourse in the center of Brussels, Wednesday, March 23, 2016. Bombs exploded yesterday at the Brussels airport and one of the city’s metro stations Tuesday, killing and wounding scores of people, as a European capital was again locked down amid heightened security threats. (AP Photo/Martin Meissner)

One of the most interesting reports on terror and its uses came out of Donald Trump’s campaign for the United States Presidency. As “The Donald” aligned in himself with Russia’s President Putin, light was cast on Putin’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and shards of that light illuminated the United States long time funding, circa 1950’s of Saudi radical jihadists until this present day mass chaos, including 911 up to the now infamous Bataclan incident in Paris, 2015. Points to ponder, including nefarious references to the Illuminati.

This is a current post that further adds to the fire of terrorism and the rhetoric and governance that supports it .

This is terrorism – vis a vis Donald Trump.

The Donald went Rogue. He used his incomparable talents to vent, create, insult and challenge not only America but the world. He placed himself into a petri dish and we all watched as he exposed himself under the world’s microscope. Yes, he makes for Great TV – as in his series, where he called the shots but suddenly he was no longer on reality TV and he forgot that. Or he forgot that despite what he says – it’s not real.

Flags should fly at half-mast -signifying the end of the reign of the King of self-promotion. His rating is F- as in fail or Z as in the end of the alphabet. His was the throwing himself on the sword of voluminous hate mongering verbiage. He was so fixated with Dante’s Paradiso that he threw himself into hell. For no reason.

Broadway will go Dark when the performance has ended. It’s the death of his legend.

So Bye Bye Bye!

The most outrageous Donald Trump quotes, ever

  1. “An ‘extremely credible source’ has called my office and told me that Barack Obama’s birth certificate is a fraud”

Trump was determined to ‘expose’ President Obama’s birthplace back in 2012, and even claimed to have sent investigators to Hawaii in the hopes of proving Obama wasn’t born in the United States.

  1. “Robert Pattinson should not take back Kristen Stewart. She cheated on him like a dog & will do it again – just watch. He can do much better!”

Clearly Donald is a Team Edward kind of guy…

  1. “Ariana Huffington is unattractive, both inside and out. I fully understand why her former husband left her for a man – he made a good decision.”

Trump always has charming things to say about successful, prominent women – but he stooped particularly low with this comment about Huffington Post founder.

  1. “You know, it really doesn’t matter what the media write as long as you’ve got a young, and beautiful, piece of ass.” 

Trump proves (again) that he views a woman’s looks over anything else…

  1. “I will build a great wall – and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me – and I’ll build them very inexpensively. I will build a great, great wall on our southern border, and I will make Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words.” 

Oh for goodness sake.

  1. “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending the best. They’re not sending you, they’re sending people that have lots of problems and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bring crime. They’re rapists… And some, I assume, are good people.” 

Just another casually racial slur, then…

  1. “Our great African-American President hasn’t exactly had a positive impact on the thugs who are so happily and openly destroying Baltimore.” Don’t worry, his racist outbursts aren’t just directed at Mexico.9. “If I were running ‘The View’, I’d fire Rosie O’Donnell. I mean, I’d look at her right in that fat, ugly face of hers, I’d say ‘Rosie, you’re fired.’” 

Trump has infamously hated on Rosie O’Donnell, making crude, sexist and misogynistic remarks about her on multiple occasions.

10. “All of the women on The Apprentice flirted with me – consciously or unconsciously. That’s to be expected.” 

Because of course, no woman can resist Trump’s charms. [Throws up on keyboard]

11. “One of they key problems today is that politics is such a disgrace. Good people don’t go into government.” 

Well at least he’s showing some self awareness.

  1. “The beauty of me is that I’m very rich.” 

And not that fabulous barnet of yours?

  1. “It’s freezing and snowing in New York – we need global warming!” 

Definitely not missing the point…

  1. “I’ve said if Ivanka weren’t my daughter, perhaps I’d be dating her.” 

Possibly (/definitely) one of the creepiest things we’ve ever heard…

  1. “My fingers are long and beautiful, as, it has been well documented, are various other parts of my body.” Ew.
  2. “I have never seen a thin person drinking Diet Coke.” 

We’re glad he’s so concerned about the obesity crisis.

  1. “I think the only difference between me and the other candidates is that I’m more honest and my women are more beautiful.” 

Women aren’t possessions, Donald. They can’t belong to you.

  1. “You’re disgusting.” 

To put this into context, Donald Trump said this to the opposing lawyer during a court case when she asked for a medical break to pump breast milk for her three-month-old daughter.

  1. “The point is, you can never be too greedy.” 

Campaign slogan = sorted.

  1. “Sorry, there is no STAR on the stage tonight!”

In his Twitter liveblogging of the Democratic debate, Trump seemed to think he was watching a talent show rather than looking for the next POTUS.

21. “My Twitter has become so powerful that I can actually make my enemies tell the truth.”

We think Donald may be overestimating the power of Twitter.

22. “My IQ is one of the highest — and you all know it! Please don’t feel so stupid or insecure; it’s not your fault.”

Don’t worry, we won’t.

23. “I have so many fabulous friends who happen to be gay, but I am a traditionalist.”

What does that even mean?

24. “The other candidates — they went in, they didn’t know the air conditioning didn’t work. They sweated like dogs…How are they gonna beat ISIS? I don’t think it’s gonna happen.” 

Because sweating = the inability to solve a political crisis. Gotcha.

25. “Look at those hands, are they small hands? And, [Republican rival Marco Rubio] referred to my hands: ‘If they’re small, something else must be small.’ I guarantee you there’s no problem. I guarantee.”

Along with the petition to keep him out of the UK, can we also campaign for Trump to stop talking about his penis?

  1. “Thanks sweetie. That’s nice”

Said Donald in typically patronising style to a female 9/11 survivor. Inappropriate – and quite creepy.

  1. “Lyin’ Ted Cruz just used a picture of Melania from a shoot in his ad. Be careful, Lyin’ Ted, or I will spill the beans on your wife!”

Threatening your opponent’s wife on Twitter? Stay classy, Don…

  1. “I was down there, and I watched our police and our firemen, down on 7-Eleven, down at the World Trade Center, right after it came down”


Ah 7-Eleven, great convenience store, and def not to be confused with a national tragedy and symbol of global terrorism, eh Trump?

29. “The only card [Hillary Clinton] has is the woman’s card. She’s got nothing else to offer and frankly, if Hillary Clinton were a man, I don’t think she’d get 5 percent of the vote. The only thing she’s got going is the woman’s card, and the beautiful thing is, women don’t like her.”

Speaking from a, errr, woman’s perspective, we reckon ol’ Trumpy may be a little off with this one.

30. “Number one, I have great respect for women. I was the one that really broke the glass ceiling on behalf of women, more than anybody in the construction industry.”

Thank you Donald. Thank you for all your help.  


“Trump received another devastating blow Monday when 50 former national security officials, who all served under Republican presidents, released a harshly critical signed letter stating that, “(Trump) would be the most reckless president in American history.” The officials included Michael Chertoff and Tom Ridge, both former secretaries of homeland security, Michael Hayden, a former director of the CIA and the NSA, and John Negroponte, a former director of national intelligence and deputy secretary of state.

“He appears to lack basic knowledge about and belief in the U.S. Constitution, U.S. laws and institutions, including religious tolerance, freedom of the press and an independent judiciary,” the letter says. The officials continued, “he persistently compliments our adversaries and threatens our allies and friends. Unlike previous Presidents who had limited experience in foreign affairs, Mr. Trump has shown no interest in educating himself. He continues to display an alarming ignorance of basic facts of contemporary international politics.”
JOSE have you seen … by the dawn early light – uranus has blown trumpo clear into space.”


This is  a frightening video – it defines pure evil.

I was thinking of what value can acts of terrorism be allocated to? Why do we have terrorists and as events keep re-occurring, I wanted to explore these theories. This article goes into great detail but it still does not explain recent actions by ISIS and Boko Haram. (PARIS 11-13-15) Read the Trump article it will explain some of these acts of terrorism. Donald courts controversy, but does he mean half of what he says?

Perhaps the world always has some underlying – evil – the need to kill, maim or harm for absolutely no reason except for the need to do so. These excerpt may enlighten the process? I could not write a complete analysis of the War on Terrorism as its ongoing. The Brussels attacks of recent, indicate a desperate very evil scheme. Once opened this Pandora’s box of inequity and defilement not just disturbs it preempts reason. The reason seems to lie in illusion, delusion, confusion, suffering and death.  No good is being created. If the Saud’s  wanted Syrian gas and oil they can buy it like everybody else. If the USA wants to create embargoes in regards to oil, gas petroleum and fight arabic feudalism they can do that. But since its a hydra head of insanity, cruelty, murder and martyrdom the act of TERROR becomes sublime. Much like Schrodinger’s cat  does it really exist or is this some bizarre multidimensional reality that defines what terror is.The Schrodinger equation plays the role of  Newton’s law  and conservation of energy in classical mechanics and if applied to terrorism it can illuminate the subject.

It predicts the future behavior of a dynamic system. It is a wave equation in terms of the wave-function predicting analytically and precisely the probability of events or outcome. The precise outcome is not determined, but given a large number of events, the Schrodinger equation will predict the distribution of results.  14 years after 911 we had the France and Brussels attacks in 2015. Followed by the epilogue of Brussels 2016. War is forecasted in 2016. A war against terrorism and that prophecy is tied to the USA american presidency. For sure if Trump wins there will be a war . If another like Hillary Clinton – was elected war will follow slower than Trump but War none the less. I can’t see Hillary winning or if she does its a short presidency as her health is poor and the demands of the Office – well its too much to handle. A younger Hillary could have done it but this 2016 model though Vintage is passed its Buy -Sell Date. Though in the battle of The Hills Versus “The Don” is quite a contretemps . She could get close to The Oval, based on his repugnant telling you as it is nature, and he could be catapulted into, ” Hall Hail The Chief” by her willingness to run the country, as the first female president. But “THE DON” has donned

NERO’s anthesis numerical value, known today as 666.

The issue of terror that we have is of the mercenary ilk. These are terrorists for the highest bidder, wanting to undermine the status quo for just evil biddings.

Drone strikes are creating hatred towards America that will last for generations

Interview 1112 – William Engdahl Explains the Context of the Paris Attacks


Most religious terrorist groups can trace their origin to key historical events.  Institutional memory is long, as the example of Irish terrorism points out, and it is not uncommon for the group to conduct rituals designed to “never forget” some long-ago grievance.  In one sense, this is why religious terrorism is popular, because political terrorism, like politics, has a much shorter memory.  Another variety of religious terrorism has its roots in millenarianism, where the key event is some doomsday or apocalyptic date where something was supposed to happen.  We know from studies of UFO cults that such groups are often more dangerous after an event fails to happen because of cognitive dissonance, which forces a rearrangement of attitudes and beliefs that are frequently more rigid and fantastic.  However, political events also serve as the catalyst for religious terrorism, and these are usually tied into whatever messianic traditions the religion has.  For example, the rise of al-Ikhwan Muslim militancy can be traced to a date in 1979 (during the Islamic year 1400) when the return of the prophet Madhi was anticipated at the Grand Mosque in Mecca.  Adherents of the belief stormed the mosque by force, which happened to coincide with a time for pilgrimage and the height of the tourist season.  The government reacted by forcing the militants out, cementing forever a date of infamy in which the group became certain that the homeland needed rescuing from secularization.  Religious terrorists also typically have “mourning periods” or dates such as “anniversary of the martyrs” because these activities are important ways the group recruits true believers from those who have been standing on the sidelines.  Recruitment generally is followed by a reeducation program that changes the way a person thinks about good and evil.  Anything foreign, secular, or modern without question becomes evil; and anything supporting an all-out, uncompromising struggle with the enemy, including the killing of innocents, becomes good.  The only exceptions are when the group has freed up some nonviolent avenues of experimentation. 

  • If any of this is true, then the massacre of the faithful at Hajj in 2015, may have been a reflection of an act of terror from Allah. The Koran forbids all these terrorists acts, with cries of Allah Akbar. Yet Muslims trampled Muslims, while performing the ritualistic stoning of pillars, to fight the devil. This new stampede in an unlikely repeated scenario on the grounds of Mina near MECCA, killing 1,453. Mecca ,is  Ground zero for the Islamic faith. Truth is really stranger than fiction. If AP’s figures are accurate, the Mina stampede would be the single deadliest recorded incident in the hajj. 14 years after the twin towers occurred on 911. Some say, this is divine retribution, as the perversion of faith is an act of terror. 
  • Canada has pledged 25,000 Syrian refuges to Canada. A massive humanitarian act. But and this is a BIG BUT! Canada is very expensive – the major cites that got the refugees, at this time Toronto – froze the process. The reason where do you accommodate all these people. They had to say halt as there was no room at the INN and the costs to house, clothe, feed these people are – astronomical.  The other concern I had was the D-PTSD – Delayed Post traumatic Stress Disorder.
  • Voila its in the news.

Cristoph De Caermichael

  • Here is a link worth exploring. It goes into extreme details of the aftermath of Brussels and the lot that are involved.

“The point of theory isn’t to think safe thoughts, but dangerous thoughts.” (Ronald Beiner)

    Understanding the motivations and causes of terrorism helps to frame a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.  Terrorists are not a homogeneous group.  Their roots are diverse, not being the same from place to place.  Some see themselves as legitimate geopolitical actors, while others are nothing more than gangs or thrill-kill cults.  The history of theoretical effort at understanding terrorism comes from the subfield of collective violence in the field of political science, and indeed, prior to the emergence of criminal justice as a separate discipline in the early 1970s.  it can be safely said that political science pretty much had a monopoly over theories of terrorism, followed perhaps by the disciplines of religion and economics.  Sociological, psychological, and criminological theories have also certainly had a role to play with some relevance.  We will begin, first, with the theories of political violence, and it is customary to say at this point that none of the following ideologies, or any ideology for that matter, are being advocated.  The purpose is to provide an objective overview of theories, concepts, causal factors, and models.  The underlying concern should be to answer the questions “Why Does Terrorism Occur?” or “What Causes It?” rather than pass judgement or assess any of the theories at this point.  With the political theories, we shall see that it is often the form of governance which is the main cause of terrorism, and with the other theories, we will find a number of subcultural and personality factors at work.  With other theories, such as sociology, we will see how things like the interplay between social movements and societal response can explain terrorism.

    It should be noted that theory is more than the study of motive.  In criminology, theories tend to take on more than the explanation of offender mindsets and behavior.  They often tackle issues such as victimology and criminal justice system response.  Motive itself is frequently ignored in the prosecution of terrorists (Smith 1994; Smith, Damphousse, Jackson & Karlson 2002).  Sentencing variation exists in bringing terrorists to justice mostly due to “structural-contextual” effects (when components of criminal justice work more interdependently and not at odds with one another), and also to “liberation” effects (when judges and juries do not feel free to follow their own sentiments because the terrorist event was of high severity).  Research is another area where theory tries to be useful.  Terrorism databases, such as the one at the UMD START Database, are often analyzed in various ways which afford an opportunity to test theories, tease out the relevant variables or factors, and do comparative theory testing, etc., all of which point to the larger purposes of theory, such as to guide research and policy.


    Terrorism is most definitely not a form of governance, but anarchism is.  Most anarchists reject terrorism in its vanguard varieties (for nationalist or religious purposes), but in a theoretical sense, anarchism justifies terrorism as a form of criminal action that attacks the values of an organized, complacent society.  Anarchism is a theory of governance that rejects any form of central or external authority, preferring instead to replace it with alternative forms of organization such as shaming rituals for deviants, mutual assistance pacts between citizens, syndicalism (any non-authoritarian organizational structure that gives the greatest freedom to workers), iconoclasm (the destruction of cherished beliefs), libertarianism (a belief in absolute liberty), and plain old rugged individualism.  Anarchism is often referred to as the nineteenth century roots of terrorism, the term first being introduced in 1840 by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.  Anarchism defined is the rejection of the state, of any form of coercive government, of any form of domination and exploitation.  It is the notion of free and equal access to all the world’s resources to enable positive freedom (freedom to) in place of negative freedom (freedom from, or the basis of most constitutional rights).     

    As a theory, anarchism holds a unique place in history because it was the first revolutionary movement to come up with systematic ideas about the purpose of agitation.  You’ll recognize some of these ideas as terrorist tactics, but it’s important first to understand them in the context of anarchism.  Proudhon contributed the idea of finding the “moment” as in when the moment is ripe for revolutionary action.  Another anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, popularized the idea of “propaganda by deed” or letting your actions speak for themselves, which was a theory originally developed by Carlo Pisacane, an Italian revolutionary who argued that ideas spring from deeds and not the other way around.  Over the years, this notion has evolved into a fairly competent philosophy of the bomb as part of a propaganda campaign to stimulate awareness and sympathy with the cause, and in this respect has been noted as a defining feature of terrorism (Georges-Abeyie & Hass 1982).  Bakunin’s ideas strongly influenced anarchism because his concept of propaganda by deed also included a prohibition against large scale group action (it being better, he thought, for anarchist action to be individualized or done in small groups).  Most anarchists operate on the principle of leaderless resistance, or acting on your own, with little knowledge or support of the groups they may belong to.  Another anarchist, Sergei Nachaev, who was an associate of Bakunin, glorified the “merciless” aspect of destruction, but it was Bakunin who laid out the six steps necessary to destroy a social structure, as paraphrased below:

  • Kill the intelligensia (kill those who are intelligent and most energetic in society)
  • Kidnap the rich and powerful (those who will yield the biggest ransoms)
  • Infiltrate the politicians (to find out their secrets and discredit them)
  • Help the guilty criminals (to confuse society over justice and punishment)
  • Defend the loudmouths (those who make dangerous declarations)
  • Nurture the supporters (help fellow travelers who believe in societal destruction)

    Major anarchist figures, like Karl Heinzen and Johann Most, contributed the idea that murder, especially murder-suicide, constituted the highest form of revolutionary struggle.  Both advocated the use of weapons of mass destruction.  Other anarchists contributed different ideas, such as Peter Kropotkin’s notion of “propaganda by word” or radicalizing the public by use of subversive publications.  Anarchism (like fascism) has also had some influential female figures, and Emma Goldman (1869-1940) comes to mind as a early founder of free speech (the ACLU) and sexual freedom movements.  Minor figures in the history of anarchism, like Charles Gallo, Auguste Vaillante, Emile Henry, and Claudius Konigstein advocated the idea that to have the most effect, the targets must be innocents (in places such as crowded dance halls or shopping centers) or symbols of economic success (like banks and stock exchanges).  It may be worth noting, in passing, that the famous Italian criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, developed his notion of the “born criminal” in part by being called in to examine the physical features of some minor anarchists who were really nothing more than criminals justifying their behavior with anarchist talk.

    Between 1875 and 1912, anarchists alone or in small groups managed to assassinate or attempt to assassinate the leaders of nine (9) different countries, including the U.S. (with President William McKinley in 1901).  These crimes were just the most well-known acts of anarchism, as anarchists were involved in numerous ordinary crimes such as theft, robbery, murder, kidnapping, assault, and bombing.  The most famous incident was the Haymarket riot in Chicago during 1886.  During these peak years for classic anarchism, May Day celebrations became famous as all-out crime-rampant days.  Police departments around the world became convinced there was an international conspiracy, and suspicious foreigners were locked up by the hundreds in many countries.  Perfunctory trials were held, and many defendants were hanged or deported.  The most famous of these trials was the 1920 case of Sacco and Vanzetti who were more antiwar and labor activists than anarchists.  Classic anarchism started to break up during the Russian Revolution, when something called anarcho-communism (also called libertarian communism) came about.  Peter Kropotkin is generally regarded as the most important theorist of this strand, but charismatic figures in the 1920s such as Nestor Makhno were just as important.  Anarcho-communism (as opposed to collectivist anarchism) totally rejects the idea of ownership in favor of the idea of usage.  They also believe in spontaneous satisfaction of bodily needs and urges.  Twentieth-century terrorist groups which later claimed an ancestry with anarchism include: the Japanese Red Army, the British Angry Brigade, the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Weatherman in the United States, and the Mexican Zapatista movement (Kushner 2003).  During the Spanish revolution of 1936, something called anarcho-syndicalism came about, which best describes a loose confederation of various protest groups (see the Workers Solidarity Alliance website).  For example, those who call themselves anarchists today (see Purkis & Bowen 1997) are somewhat likely to be environmentalists, survivalists, alternative currency traders, and/or part of the anti-globalization movement who hate institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, or World Trade Organization.  Anarchists are not inherently antagonistic toward Jews, their anti-Semitism being constrained by the fact they don’t believe in pogroms (race riots).

    For purpose of balance, it is important to point out that anarchism today does not support terrorism.  It has historically supported terrorism and even today might support some acts of terrorism, but there are only weak theoretical links between the two, most strongly with the propaganda by deed concept.  Anarchists hold to a doctrine that anarchy must be created in the act of self-liberation from oppressive and coercive relationships.  You don’t blow up the relationship as terrorists do; instead, you convince others that grounds for the existing relationship must be blown up.  Anarchism is not really about mad bombing or chaos.  Terrorists target people; anarchists target things such as institutions and structures.  Bakunin did not want the death of people but the destruction of things and positions of authority.  Only a small minority of terrorists have ever been anarchists, and only a small minority of anarchists have ever been terrorists.  Anarchists of almost all stripes do not believe in prisons or keeping prisoners in cells.

    In fact, there is an area of study called anarchist criminology, a controversial subfield of critical criminology which celebrates the difficulties anarchism has had finding a workable definition (Tifft 1979; Ferrell 1997).  Anarchist criminology advocates the abolishment of criminal justice systems.  It argues that much harm has been committed in the name of reasonableness, and anarchist criminology is committed to promoting the unthinkable and unreasonable.  Like other subfields of critical criminology, anarchist criminology views the state as an inherently oppressive entity, and anarchist justice not only promotes social justice (equal access to all resources), but protects diversity and difference among people (Ferrell 1999).     


    Fascism is the one form of government with the most disagreement about a definition for it.  However, Passmore (2002) attempts a definition as the consolidation of an ultranationalist ideology that is unabashedly racist.  The word comes from the Latin “fasces” which means to use power to scare or impress people.  It generally refers to the consolidation of all economic and political power into some form of super-patriotism that is devoted to genocide or endless war with one’s enemies.  Benito Mussolini, who practically invented the term in 1922, said it is the merger of state and corporate power.  Mussolini’s version of fascism was based on the idea of an indomitable power and an attempt to resurrect imperial Rome.  Adolf Hitler said fascism is the clever and constant application of propaganda so that people can be made to see paradise as hell, and the other way around.  Hitler’s brand of fascism drew upon philosophical reflections by Hegel, Nietzsche, and Spengler, and also drew upon Nordic folk romance from Wagner to Tacitus.  Japanese fascism involved racism, fanaticism, historical destiny, and a mixture of Bushido, Zen and Shinto Buddhism, emperor worship, and past samurai legends.

    So-called Islamo-Fascism can be traced to the time period of the birth of Nazi “national socialist” fascism in 1928 when the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan Al Muslimun), parent organization of numerous terrorist groups, was formed in reaction to the 1924 abolition of the caliphate by the Turks.  Islamofascism draws heavily upon the Muslim Brotherhood pamphleteers, but also upon on the Koran, the career of Saladin, and the tracts of Nasserites and Baathists.  The term, “Islamic Fascism” is a better term to use, best describing the agenda of contemporary radical Islam.  It captures the twin thrusts of reactionary fascism today.  In one sense, fascism is born out of insecurity and a sense of failure, but in another sense,  fascism thrives in a once-proud, humbled but ascendant, people.  Envy and false grievance are the trademarks of such reactionary fascism.  Believers are subject to all kinds of conspiratorial delusions that setbacks were caused by others and can be erased through ever more zealotry.  Fascist leaders love conspiracies and lies; nothing they say should be trusted. 

    Fascism supports terrorism at home and abroad.  Charismatic leaders are usually given supreme powers to crack down on dissidents, peacemakers, and anyone who doesn’t abide by the “cult of the individual” which worships a He-man mentality and the party line.  With the frequent wars and militaristic ventures that come with fascism, an effort is made to demonize the enemy as sub-humans who deserve extinction.  These enemies are also made into scapegoats for all the past problems a country has had.  Fascism appeals to the frustrations and resentments of a race of people who think they ought to have a bigger place at the global table.  When combined with an anti-western slant (the United States as Great Satan), fascism becomes a means of social identity (Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, Islamo-Fascism) as well as a facilitator of terrorism.

    Frustrated fascists who fail to gain control in their own countries have historically turned to terrorism.  They are most likely to turn to domestic terrorism since fascists do not believe that citizen rights are bestowed merely because someone inhabits a country.  Nor do they believe that all human beings are possessed of equal rights.  “Foreign” families and businesses (as they define them) are usually targeted for extermination by fascists.  The enemies who are seen as the greatest threat are usually those who fascists see as corrupting or poisoning family and property relations. 

    Fascism is full of ironies and contradictions.  On the one hand, it is anti-modern in its glorification of the land, a return to country life, and its fascination with peasant dress or costume.  On the other hand, it is pro-modern in its worship of military technology, favoritism of big business, mass mobilization of people, promotion of commercialized sport, and its surprisingly liberal attitude toward the involvement of women in the movement.  Science and scholarship also take on interesting twists under fascism.  “Hard” sciences like biology and chemistry usually advance significantly, especially in areas such as genetic research.  “Soft” sciences like sociology and psychology usually become usurped into mumbo-jumbo pseudoscientific ideas about a glorified folk culture and reasons for hating the enemy.

    Just as anarchists have their May Day (May 1st) celebrations, fascists also tend to celebrate anniversaries.  Many terrorists, of course, have been known to time their attacks to coincide with the date for an historical event or the birthday of someone special to them.  For example, with ecoterrorism, that day is October 16, which coincides the the United Nation’s World Food Day, and is usually when McDonald’s restaurants are targeted for vandalism.  However, the most important date in the study of terrorism is April 19.  A number of significant events have happened on that date.  Right-wing domestic terrorist groups call it “Militia Day” because it was when the siege at Waco ended, it was when surveillance began at the Ruby Ridge compound in Idaho, and it marks the anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing of the federal building.  Neo-Nazi fascist groups celebrate April 19 because it was the day German Nazis started wiping out Jewish ghettos across Europe, as well as the following day being Adolf Hitler’s birthday.  Internationally, terrorist groups who regard themselves as “freedom fighters” and trace at least part of this justification to the American Revolution, take heart in the fact that the American Revolution started on April 19, 1775 at the Battle of Lexington.  It remains to be seen if September 11 will replace April 19 as the most popular date for terrorism.         


    More than one criminologist has pointed out that the disciplines of theology, religion, and philosophy have had important things to say about terrorism (Stitt 2003; Kraemer 2004).  It is also a fact that about a quarter of all terrorist groups and about half of the most dangerous ones on earth are primarily motivated by religious concerns (Hoffman 1993).  They believe that God not only approves of their action, but that God demands their action.  Their cause is sacred, and consists of a combined sense of hope for the future and vengeance for the past.  Of these two components, the backward-looking desire for vengeance may be the more important trigger for terrorism because the forward-looking component (called apocalyptic thinking, or eschatology) produces wild-eyed fanatics who are more a danger to themselves and their own people.  The trick to successful use of terrorism in the name of religion rests upon convincing believers or convertees that a “neglected duty” exists in the fundamental, mainstream part of the religion.  Religious terrorism is therefore, NOT about extremism, fanaticism, sects, or cults, but is instead all about a fundamentalist or militant interpretation of the basic tenets.  Most religious traditions are filled with plenty of violent images at their core, and destruction or self-destruction is a central part of the logic behind religion-based terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2001).  Evil is often defined as malignant narcissism from a theological point of view, and religion easily serves as moral cover for self-centered terrorists and psychopaths (Stitt 2003).  Religion has always absorbed or absolved evil and guilt in what is called theodicy, or the study of how the existence of evil can be reconciled with a good and benevolent God.  Most religions theodicize evil away as either: (1) a test of faith; (2) a product of free will; (3) part of God’s plan; or (4) functional to let people learn right from wrong; and terrorists easily make use of these established theodicies or critiques of them (Kraemer 2004).  

    To be sure, the usual pattern in religious-based terrorism is for a psychopathic, spiritual leader to arise that is regarded as somewhat eccentric at first (a tendency toward messianism).  But then, as this leader develops their charisma, they tend to appear more and more mainstream and scholarly.  They begin to mingle political with religious issues (a tendency toward theocracy), and little-known religious symbols or pieces of sacred text take on new significance.  Quite often, these symbols are claimed to be an important part of that religion’s history that has somehow been neglected.  The stage is then set for blaming somebody for the betrayal of this sacred heritage.  First, the politicians in one’s own country are blamed, but soon a foreign influence, like secularization or modernization is blamed.  Militant religions quickly move to blaming a foreign influence for at least three reasons:  (1) it doesn’t serve the religion’s survival interests to blame a homeland; (2) it makes use of a long history of competition, animosity, and war between the world’s different religions; and (3) any blaming to be done must occur on the symbolic or cosmic level, which is to say that the enemy cannot have a face, but must be some impersonal, evil-like force or influence.  Hence, the most specific enemy a militant religion can have is some global trend like secularization, modernization, or Westernization.  The strength of fundamentalism is its ability to guarantee a radical change is coming without specifying exactly what it will look like.  However, once a semi-vague enemy has been identified, the religious movement borrows the idea of “sovereignty” from the political realm and begins to see itself as the legitimate defender of the faith and legitimate restorer of dignity to the homeland.  Most importantly, such “defenders” justify terrorist action in their accountability only to God, for it is God who has chosen them for this sacred mission in history. 

    Perhaps the most interesting aspect of religion as a theory of terrorism is how a devout believer could come to mix politics and religion in such a way.  The answer is in the conception of worship.  Most of us associate worship with dressing up, the ringing of church bells, and one-way communication with God (human to God).  But worship is not just about the liturgy of church ritual.  Worship is part of service to God and all of humanity on behalf of God (striving to receive instructions from God).  Politics is also about service, especially public service.  So-called “liberation theology” that permeates Latin America has always had a handle on this aspect of worship as service which is intended to bring about the emancipation of the poor.  Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), a founder of the Italian communist party who is best remembered for the concept of hegemony (Bocock 1986), or the idea of an all-encompassing world-view, also postulated a model of worship as opposition.  To engage in any sort of enterprise involving service to God, humanity, or social justice, each group of devout worshippers must see through their religious culture toward political goals.  It is not so much as using religion to achieve secular ends, but the transformation of theology to create “free spaces” that permit creative action consistent with that religion’s view on the needed transformation of society.  A key theological transformation that supports terrorism would be the notion that communal violence, even though violence is despised, is still a form of worship that may help discover the true nature of God and open up two-way communication with God (God to human).

    Religious terrorism can be quite extreme in its tactics.  Not only does it strive to avenge a long history of persecution and injustice, but it frequently carries out preemptive attacks.  This is because a high level of paranoia is usually maintained about the actual degree of threat that the enemy trend poses.  Rarely are religious terrorists swayed by secular sources of information about the degree of actual threat, but instead are driven by doctrinal differences of opinion over interpretation of holy scriptures.  This results in two things:  (1) a rather non-selective targeting pattern, lashing out blindly, often harming innocents; and (2) the creation of numerous offshoot, spin-off, or fringe groups who believe they are commanded to follow a different mission imperative.  Add to this the fact that most adherents have already long felt like alienated and marginal members of society, and you’ve got a recipe for perhaps the most dangerous or prolific kind of terrorism in the world today.

    Most religious terrorist groups can trace their origin to key historical events.  Institutional memory is long, as the example of Irish terrorism points out, and it is not uncommon for the group to conduct rituals designed to “never forget” some long-ago grievance.  In one sense, this is why religious terrorism is popular, because political terrorism, like politics, has a much shorter memory.  Another variety of religious terrorism has its roots in millenarianism, where the key event is some doomsday or apocalyptic date where something was supposed to happen.  We know from studies of UFO cults that such groups are often more dangerous after an event fails to happen because of cognitive dissonance, which forces a rearrangement of attitudes and beliefs that are frequently more rigid and fantastic.  However, political events also serve as the catalyst for religious terrorism, and these are usually tied into whatever messianic traditions the religion has.  For example, the rise of al-Ikhwan Muslim militancy can be traced to a date in 1979 (during the Islamic year 1400) when the return of the prophet Madhi was anticipated at the Grand Mosque in Mecca.  Adherents of the belief stormed the mosque by force, which happened to coincide with a time for pilgrimage and the height of the tourist season.  The government reacted by forcing the militants out, cementing forever a date of infamy in which the group became certain that the homeland needed rescuing from secularization.  Religious terrorists also typically have “mourning periods” or dates such as “anniversary of the martyrs” because these activities are important ways the group recruits true believers from those who have been standing on the sidelines.  Recruitment generally is followed by a reeducation program that changes the way a person thinks about good and evil.  Anything foreign, secular, or modern without question becomes evil; and anything supporting an all-out, uncompromising struggle with the enemy, including the killing of innocents, becomes good.  The only exceptions are when the group has freed up some nonviolent avenues of experimentation. 

    It is important to understand the practice of martyrdom in the terrorist context.  Not only does a martyr serve recruitment and other purposes after their death, but a whole mythology develops around them, which might be called a process of martyrology (Ranstorp 1996). Targets are chosen not for strategic purposes, but for symbolic purposes, and the repercussions of an attack are managed as well.  The ideal target is one in which the martyr can inflict more damage than is expected for their size.  The idea is to produce an impression that the group is larger and more powerful than it actually is.  This feeling of power is enhanced by the use of anonymity, whereby the martyr goes through an indoctrination process where they are stripped of their real identity and provided with a false background history.  The process goes much further than establishing a cover story in case of capture.  The process involves changing the family name and home town the martyr came from, so that any repercussions or reactions to the terrorist event can be channeled toward another family or town.  In some cases, the cover story is used to direct government counterterrorism toward the wrong target (especially if the martyr’s family is well known and the town is small).  In other cases, it is used to give the impression that dozens of martyrs are coming from the same town, when in fact they are not.

    In all fairness, it should be said that most militant religious groups only adopt terrorism as a tactic of last resort.  We have not discussed Just War Doctrine here, but ethics and/or fair play are integral parts of most religions, and there are usually unwritten rules for when the cosmic struggle (as Juergensmeyer 2001 calls it) spills over into political struggle.  Religious terrorists demonstrate marvelous ingenuity in means, methods, and timing, but their targeting is flawed, and one can only wonder how strategically effective is their “symbolic” success from “striking at the heart of the infidels.”  Perhaps the whole reason for it is to bolster their reputation among other religious communities.  This would be supported by the fact that some terrorist acts are scheduled on dates specifically designed to desecrate a competitor’s religious holidays and sacred moments.


    The discipline of economics has many concepts that are relevant to an understanding of terrorism — supply and demand — costs and benefits, etc.  Fully-developed economic or econometric models of terrorism are quite rare, however, and often involve such things as “psychic” costs and benefits (Nyatepe-Coo 2004).  More down-to-earth economic theories can be found in the literature on deterrence.  Rational choice theory, in particular, has found a place in criminology, and holds that people will engage in crime after weighing the costs and benefits of their actions to arrive at a rational choice about motivation after perceiving that the chances of gain outweigh any possible punishment or loss.  Criminals must come to believe their actions will be beneficial — to themselves, their community, or society — AND they must come to see that crime pays, or is at least a risk-free way to better their situation.  Perhaps the most well-known version of this idea in criminology is routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), which postulates that three conditions must be present in order for a crime to occur: (1) suitable targets or victims who put themselves at risk; (2) the absence of capable guardians or police presence; and (3) motivated offenders or a pool of the unemployed and alienated.  Other rational choice theories exist which delve further into models of decision making.  In the few models of collective violence that have found their way into criminology, the Olson hypothesis (source unknown) suggests that participants in revolutionary violence predicate their behavior on a rational cost-benefit calculus to pursue the best course of action given the social circumstances.

    Rational choice theory, in political science, follows a similar line, and holds that people can be collectively rational, even when making what appears to be irrational decisions for them as individuals, after perceiving that their participation is important and their personal contribution to the public good outweighs any concerns they may have for the “free rider” problem (Muller and Opp 1986).  For those unfamiliar with it, the “free rider” problem is a classic paradox in social science and economics which asks why anybody should do something for the public good when most likely someone else will get credit for it and most everybody else will benefit merely by sitting idly and doing nothing.  Perhaps the most eloquent spokesperson for rational choice ideas in the field of terrorism is Wesleyan professor Martha Crenshaw (1998), whose writings inform my remarks below.

    Let’s take, for example, a typical terrorist event that involves hostage-taking and all-too-frequent hostage-killing.  From an individualist rational point of view, the best choice would be to keep at least some of the hostages alive in order to bargain with the government for leniency.  Yet, often a collectivist rational mentality sets in, and the group choice (or groupthink) is to kill all the hostages.  Is this killing senseless, the product of deranged minds, or an example of mob behavior?  The answer is NO on all points from a rational choice point of view.  It may be a reasonable and calculated response to circumstances.  It may involve a collective judgment about the most efficient course of action that has the most lasting impact on observers (for social learning purposes).  And most importantly, the senselessness of it all may be just what the group needs to make their ideological point that they are terrorists, not just ordinary criminals. 

    Terrorism is not a pathological phenomenon.  The resort to terrorism is not an aberration.  The central focus of study ought to be on why some groups find terrorism useful, and in standard control theory fashion, why other groups do not find terrorism useful.  Some groups may continue to work with established patterns of dissident action.  Other groups may resort to terrorism because they have tried other alternatives.  Still other groups may choose terrorism as an early choice because they have learned from the experiences of others, usually through the news media, and Crenshaw (1998) calls this the contagion effect, and claims it has distinctive patterns similar to the copycat effect as in other theories of collective violence (Gurr 1970).  There may be circumstances in which the terrorist group wants to publicize its cause to the world, a process Crenshaw (1995) calls the globalization of civil war.   

    Factors that influence the rational choice of terrorism include place, size, time, and the climate of international opinion.  A terrorist plot in a democratic society is less likely to involve senseless violence than a scheme hatched under an authoritarian regime because under the latter, terrorists realize they have nothing to lose with the expected repercussions.  Size is important because a small elite group is more likely to resort to terrorism when the population is passive.  This means that more senseless acts of violence may occur in a stable society rather than one on the verge of collapse.  Time constraints are important because the terrorist group may be competing with other groups or attempting to manage a tit-for-tat strategy with counterterrorism.  The climate of international opinion, if low for the problems of the host country, may force the terrorists to take action that risks a repressive counterterrorist reaction, in hopes that their suffering will capture public attention.  In short, terrorism is an excellent tool for managing the political agenda on a world stage.


    Nassar (2004) has probably written the most interesting piece on globalization theory as it relates to terrorism, and although his ideas are fairly critical of the U.S. for exporting “nightmares” as well as dreams, he does provide a robust introduction to the complex topic of globalization.  Globalization contributes to dreams, fantasies, and rising expectations, but at the same time, it leads to dashed hopes, broken dreams, and unfulfilled achievements.  Terrorism breeds in the gap between expectations and achievements.  The thinking is very similar to strain theory in criminology or the rising expectations theory of prison riots, and about the only thing unique about globalization theory is that it adds a rich-poor dichotomy.  Rich people (or nations) are seen as wanting power and wealth, and poor people (or nations) are seen as wanting justice.  From this perspective, then, rich people are part of the causal factor or root cause of terrorism, since they contribute to the conditions which give rise to it.  Perpetrators of “terrorism” (always treated as an ill-defined concept in globalization theory) are never seen as born or raised with any specific predispositions toward it.  In brief, globalization theory holds that if the oppressed and disgruntled poor people of the world were simply given the chance to find peaceful means for achieving justice, terrorism would not thrive. 

    Globalization theory is further tied into ideas about colonialism, imperialism, and neocolonialism.  The first two words are often used interchangeably to describe a set of conditions (technically, extensions of sovereignty) where the mores, values, and beliefs of the colonizers are considered superior to those of the colonized.  However, when the assumption is made that (imperial) power is a necessary thing to maintain cultural superiority, this is the usual meaning of imperialism.  Neocolonialism is a concept developed by Marxists and holders of certain conspiracy theories to refer to allegations about First World nations, international organizations, and/or multinational corporations employing economic, financial and trade policies to dominate less powerful countries.  Onwudiwe (2001) is typical of the criminological approach taken when globalization ideas are incorporated into theories about terrorism, and it is probably safe to say that the approach remains relatively underdeveloped.


    Modern sociological perspectives are primarily concerned with the social construction of fear or panic, and how institutions and processes, especially the media, primary and secondary groups, maintain that expression of fear.  It is important for students to be able to critically assess the social construction of terrorism and grasp sociological viewpoints, and as a good starting point, I would recommend Gibbs (1989) or any of several new books that critique the war on terrorism or look at it as mythology or dialogue.  However, it is equally important for students to recognize that the social constructionist viewpoint is all about consequences, not causes.  Labeling theory in criminology, for example, is a social constructionist viewpoint that, in my opinion, goes about reconnecting consequences with causes in a way that is less systematic than the way functionalists did it a long time ago.  My own theory of terrorism (O’Connor 1994) makes use of a neo-functionalist framework to chart the way terrorism impacts the whole of society by affecting core values of achievement, competition, and individualism.  Some societies become “softer” targets after terrorism (especially after short-term target hardening), and other societies become stronger in the long term.  It depends upon interaction patterns, and stabilities and interpenetrations among the structural subsystems (economy, polity, religion, law).  However, there are probably only three people in the world who understand the kind of Parsonian functionalism I’m describing, so it will most likely be the case that labeling and learning theories will dominate sociological thought on terrorism, followed by conflict or radical theories which all-too-often overdo the implication of state crime, fiscal crisis, capitalism, or imperialism with terrorism.  For a promising approach that more carefully attempts to tread these sociological waters, see Ross (1999).

    Let’s get down to the causal models of sociology rather than worry about perspectives.  Regardless of the name for the theoretical viewpoint, one is likely to encounter the following, or some variation of them, as causal factors in almost all etiological, sociology-related thinking (FIVE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF TERRORISM):

  • the frustration-aggression hypothesis

  • the relative deprivation hypothesis

  • the negative identity hypothesis

  • the narcissistic rage hypothesis

  • the moral disengagement hypothesis

    The frustration-aggression hypothesis is the idea that every frustration (not being able to engage in some behavior) leads to some form of aggression, and that every aggressive act relieves that frustration to some extent.  A professor I had once referred to it as the “flush-toilet” model of motivation because the basic notion is that stress and hassles build up until they reach a point that “breaks the camel’s back” and the displacement of released energy provides some benefit in terms of catharsis or ventilation.  Psychologists tend to view it as a drive theory which explains many kinds of behavior, but other disciplines tend to think of it as the causes of social strife which arise when some government policy (or social structural condition brought on by government policy) alienates and angers people.  Students should be advised that very sophisticated models of this hypothesis exist in criminology, and that my description is only a crude simplification.  Gurr (1970) provides the best overview of the many contours of this hypothesis.

    The relative deprivation hypothesis is the idea that as a person goes about choosing their values and interests, they compare what they have and don’t have, as well as what they want or don’t want, with real or imaginary others.  The observation or perception of deprivation is what matters, as well as an environment of rising expectations.  The person then usually perceives a discrepancy between what is possible for them and what is possible for others, and reacts to it with an inflamed sense of injustice.  Students should be advised that debates exist within criminology regarding relative deprivation and terrorism, on the one hand, within the anomie or strain traditions which sometimes find causal influence in such objective factors as Gross Domestic Product, and on the other hand, in somewhat trivial and subjective feelings of discomfort as everyday stresses and strains.  Davies (1962) pioneered the application of this hypothesis to terrorism; Gurr (1970) expanded on it; and today, there is a plethora of research on all sorts of “economic” factors such as unemployment, inequality, repression, and globalization as causes of terrorism.

    The negative identity hypothesis is the idea that, for whatever reason, a person develops a vindictive and covert rejection of the roles and statuses laid out for them by their family, community, or society.  For example, a child raised in a well-to-do family may secretly sabotage every effort made to hand them the good life on a “silver platter,” deliberately screwing up in school, at work, and everyplace else until the day comes, with some apparent life-altering experience (like engaging in terrorism), that the long-nurtured negative identity comes out, and the subject can then make it feel more like a total identity transformation.  Students should be advised that there are many varieties of this idea that exist in a number of theories across many fields of study, but as the esteemed psychologist Erik Erikson put it — “It’s better to have a negative identity than none at all.”

    The narcissistic rage hypothesis is an umbrella idea for all the numerous things that can go wrong in child-rearing, such as too much smothering, too little smothering, ineffective discipline, overly stringent discipline, psychological trauma, coming from a broken home, etc., that all leads to the same effect of a “What about Me?” reaction in the child.  It is actually a two-way process with the child contributing as much as the parents and other role models which results in a damaged self-concept, a tendency to blame others for one’s inadequacies, and the well-known “splitting” of self into a “good me” and “bad me” which often forms the basis for personality disorders involving a lack of empathy for the suffering of others.  Students should be advised that there is not all that much consensus on the primal importance of narcissism, and that the literature on child-rearing is full of mixed empirical results.  Kohut’s (1972) treatise on the subject is a definitive analysis of the revenge-driven fantasies which fuel the groundless accusations and oversensitivity to slight that characterize narcissistic rage.

    The moral disengagement hypothesis encompasses many of the ways a person neutralizes or removes any inhibitions they have about committing acts of horrific violence.  Some common patterns include imagining one’s self as a hero, portraying one’s self as agentless, minimizing the harm done, dehumanizing the victim, or insulating one’s self in routine activities.  Organized crime figures, for example, usually hide behind family activities with their wives and children.  Students should be advised that in the study of terrorism, numerous ways have been found for terrorists to rationalize their behavior which go far beyond denigrating one’s enemies and beefing one’s self up as a crusader (see Hacker 1996).  As they exercise deliberate moral agency, terrorists often seek thru their rationalizations to achieve a complete shift in the way government and civil society is perceived.  They accomplish this thru “sanitized” language, doublespeak, and euphemistic language (Bandura 2002).

    Psychological perspectives, with few exceptions (Ross 1996; 1999), are decidedly clinical in what is often a futile attempt to find something pathological in the terrorist personality.  Merari (1990) provides a good overview of psychological approaches, but one of the major names in this area is David Long, former assistant director of the State Department’s Office of Counter Terrorism, who has gone on record saying there’s no such thing as a terrorist personality, but then has said they typically suffer from low self-esteem, are attracted to groups with charismatic leaders, and enjoy risk-taking (Long 1990).  A sampling of psychological factors that have been investigated include: ineffective parenting or rebellion against one’s parents, a pathological need for absolutism, and a variety of other “syndromes” and hypotheses (see Margolin 1977), but study after study for the past thirty years has yielded very little valid and reliable information about the psychology of terrorists other than the following generalizations:

A Summary of Psychological Knowledge about Terrorism

     As far as we know, most terrorists feel that they are doing nothing wrong when they kill and injure people. They seem to share a feature of the psychological condition known as antisocial personality disorder or psychopathic personality disorder, which is reflected by an absence of empathy for the suffering of others.  However, they do not appear unstable or mentally ill for this.  A common feature is a type of thinking such as “I am good and right. You are bad and wrong.”  It is a very polarized thinking which allows them to distance themselves from opponents and makes it easier for them to kill people. It is not the same kind of simplistic thinking one would expect from someone with low intelligence or moral development. Most terrorists are of above average intelligence and have sophisticated ethical and moral development.  A closed-minded certainty is a common feature of terrorist thinking.  (Merari 1990)

    Although what we don’t know about the psychology of terrorism is more than what we do know, there have been several promising attempts to merge or combine psychology with sociology (and criminal justice) into what might be called terrorist profiling (Russell and Miller 1977; Bell 1982; Galvin 1983; Strentz 1988; Hudson 1999).  This line of inquiry actually has a long history, and includes what rare studies exist of female terrorists.  The earliest study (Russell and Miller 1977) found that the following people tend to join terrorist organizations:

  • 22-25 years of age

  • 80% male, with women in support roles

  • 75-80% single

  • 66% middle or upper class background

  • 66% some college or graduate work

  • 42% previous participation in working class advocacy groups

  • 17% unemployed

  • 18% strong religious beliefs                

    These data, as well as other known characteristics and attributes about terrorists, have found their way into databases, some public, some private.  One of the most well-known databases used by researchers is the RAND-St. Andrews University Chronology of International Terrorism.  When suicide bombing became popular, Merari (1990) conducted rare interviews with terrorists, and found that most suicide terrorists are between the ages of 16 and 28.  Most are male, but 15% are female and that proportion is rising.  Many come from poor backgrounds and have limited education, but some have university degrees and come from wealthy families.   

    We’ll return again from time to time to this group of theories, and new developments, because criminology is quite heavily informed by sociology and psychology.  What sociological and psychological approaches basically tell us now is that individuals join terrorist organizations in order to commit acts of terrorism, and that this process is the same as when individuals join criminal subcultures in order to commit acts of crime. There appears to be no unique terrorist personality.  Instead, there appear to be unique subcultural phenomena which develop, support, and enhance a penchant for cold-blooded, calculated violence which, if not satisfied within a terrorist organization might be fulfilled elsewhere.  Terrorism is a social activity.  Individuals join a terrorist group usually after they have tried other forms of political involvement.   The emotional links between individuals and the strength of commitment to their ideology appear to become stronger by the group living in the underground and facing adversity in the form of counterterrorism.  Socialization in the underground is quite intense, and Ferracuti (1982), a criminologist, has documented the “fantasy wars” that go on in the terrorist underground.  An individual’s identity may become tied to the group’s identity, but it is just as likely that emotional relationships become as important (if not more) than the group’s purpose.  This means that the distribution of beliefs among members in a terrorist group may be uneven.  There may be major differences between individual and group ideology.  Ideology may not necessarily be the main component of motivation.  From profiling terrorists for many years, we know that most of them are action-hungry practitioners, not theoreticians.  This knowledge may provide new counterterrorism strategies which attempt to change individual beliefs and weaken group cohesion.


    The leading exponent of the terrorist-as-mentally-ill approach is Jerrold Post (1984; 1990), who has gone on record saying that the most dangerous terrorist is likely to be a religious terrorist, and that all terrorists suffer from negative childhood experiences and a damaged sense of self.  His analysis of the terrorist “mindset” (a word that substitutes for terrorist personality, and technically means a fixed mental attitude or inclination) draws upon a view of mental illness that compels, or forces, people to commit horrible acts.  It should be noted that we know from criminal justice that this is not the only possible view on mental illness.  More “crazy” people come into contact with the law through sheer folly and foolishness than a compulsion their mental illness made them have.  Post (1990) makes a somewhat neo-Freudian distinction between terrorists who desire to “destroy the nation, or world, of their fathers” and those who desire to “carry on the mission, or world, of their fathers.”  In short, it boils down to the Oedipus Complex, which is hating or loving your father, or at least the “world” they represent.  There is actually some empirical support for this viewpoint.  For example, when solitary terrorist offenders are studied, such as skyjackers and mail bombers, a severely dysfunctional relationship with their father is often found.  The “anarchic-ideologue” terrorist, according to Post (1984) is rebelling against their father, and according to Kaplan (1981), has a pathological need to pursue absolute ends because of their damaged sense of self-worth.  For a review of these and related theories, see Ruby (2002). 

    Another analysis is provided by Jessica Stern (1999) who attempts to gain psychological insight into the distinction between “doomsday” terrorists, who would use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that might end all life on earth, and “dangerous” terrorists, who would limit themselves to the conventional arsenal of terrorism.  Stern’s concern is primarily with the counterproliferation of WMD, but cases studies of groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, the Tamil Tigers, Al-Qaida, and Hizballah show that terrorists most likely to use WMD tend to be afflicted with paranoia and megalomania.  Of these two illnesses, the megalomania is more severe, and the paranoia is at such a moderate level that it enhances their intelligence and keeps them from becoming schizophrenics or sociopaths.  Stern (1999) takes exception with arguments that terrorists suffer from any antisocial, psychopathic, or sociopathic disorder.  Likewise, Victoroff (2005) says even though there is no such thing as a terrorism questionnaire (no one has validated a terrorism quotient or found a terrorist gene), it might be promising to measure their sense of oppression and feeling of subjugation, but one would have to account for the deep levels of fervor, hatred, bravado and other psychodynamic pressures at work.    

    Walter Laqueur (1999) offers the idea that we need to distinguish between terrorists who are “fanatics” and those who are “extremists.”  The standard meaning of these terms is that fanatics are religious zealots and extremists are political zealots, but Laqueur (1999) strips away any religious connotation, and says that most terrorists are fanatics.  The concept of fanaticism carries some implications of mental illness, but is not in itself a diagnostic category.  Laqueur (1999) claims that fanaticism is characterized by excessive cruelty and sadism, but others (Taylor 1994) have pointed out that fanaticism is characterized by the following:

  • prejudice toward out-groups

  • authoritarianism

  • an unwillingness to compromise

  • a disdain for other alternative views

  • a tendency to see things in black and white

  • a rigidity of belief

  • a perception of the world that reflects a closed mind

    To this, we might add the concept of Machiavellianism (Oots & Wiegele 1985), which refers to an extreme form of the psychological trait of manipulativeness.  Terrorists are disposed to not only manipulate their victims, but the audience as well.  Both the timing of a future event and the aftermath of a completed event are manipulated by terrorists.  For example, the counterterrorism reaction by authorities is manipulated.  The press and public are manipulated, with terrorists doing everything they can to work the media and obtain liberal press coverage.  The fact that terrorism is aimed more at the audience than victim has provided numerous points of conjecture for researchers.  It has been the source of most theoretical models of terrorist contagion, whereby different terrorist groups compete with one another for media attention, most theoretical models of copycat behavior, whereby different terrorist groups try to outdo a previous group with the harm inflicted, and more importantly, the contributions of biological and physiological researchers.


    David Hubbard (1983) was one of the first biological researchers of terrorism, and his line of work is similar to the familiar cycle of violence hypothesis in criminal justice.  In this view, people who commit repetitive and cyclical acts of violence (which would include wife beaters, rapists, and serial killers) are driven by hormonal or neurochemical fluctuations in their body or brain chemistry.  Three compounds, in particular, have been singled out as having abnormal levels among terrorists:  norepinephrine, acetylcholine, and endorphins.  Of these, norepinephrine is suspected as being the most influential, as it is associated with the so-called flight or fight mechanism in human biology.  The theory of “fight or flight” was developed by W. B. Cannon back in 1929, and refers to a state of arousal under stress in which the heart, lungs, and muscle operate more efficiently.  As it applies to terrorism (and crime), the behavioral requirements of such activities (fighting exhilaration before an event, and fleeing manipulation of audience after an event) produce a syndrome of physiological need for arousal at fairly regular intervals.  Motives for terrorism appear to be quite stable when the biological viewpoint is taken, and it is possible to link a variety of aspects in the typical terrorist profile with biological factors.  For example, xenophobia may be biological induced since the fear of strangers tends to be discernible even at infantile stages of development.  Other explanations might involve insights from sociobiology (Wilson 1975) or kin selection theory in evolutionary psychology (Daly & Wilson 1994).  For more information on biological factors as causes of criminal behavior, look for the psychobiological chapter in almost any good criminology textbook.  For an overview of how to apply the biological framework to counterterrorism, I would recommend my own work commissioned by the government (O’Connor 2010).


    It’s not easy applying traditional criminological theories to terrorism.  Most of these theories were designed to explain ordinary street crime like robbery or burglary, and have a certain hardiness to their perspectives which makes them difficult to extend.  Ruggiero (2005) is typical of those who have attempted to apply such theories or suggest various extensions, starting with Durkheim’s functionalism by asking whether Durkheim would see terrorism as part of the “normality of crime” or as part of a clearly unacceptable, dysfunctional form of crime.  On the one hand, Durkheim said that all crime serves positive functions (of innovation and evolution), but on the other hand, the organic metaphor that Durkheim used seems to suggest that some forms of crime only cause disintegration and are cancerous.  The Chicago school of disorganization in criminology would presumably focus on the distinctiveness of different social worlds between terrorists and non-terrorists, analyzing the communication blockages, for example.  Strain theorists would likely argue that terrorism is inevitable as a manifestation of the broken promise that everybody can rise from rags to riches, and study the adaptation Merton described as rebellion.  Learning theorists would likely emphasize the importance of role models or the “techniques of neutralization” involved along with the drift into a terrorist lifestyle.  Labeling theorists would probably say, cynically but truly, that terrorism is “what the other person does.”  Control theorists would likely focus on terrorists being unattached, unloved, uncommitted to education or business, uninvolved in conventional tasks, and having their hands idle so time becomes the “devil’s playground” for them.  Conflict theorists would probably focus on the presence or absence of associations that provide room for collective action and permanent confrontation, although more radical versions of conflict theory might glamorize terrorism as proto-revolutionary action.  Integrated theories would likely focus on the influences of aggressive proneness, provocation, and the support of third parties.


    Freilich (2003) does a good job of reviewing the theories in this category, a relatively small area of research which tends to be studied within a field called the sociology of social movements.  There are three groups of theories.  The first is called economic/social integration theory, and it holds that high concentrations of farming, economic depression, and social disorganization are all related to high levels of domestic terrorist activity, militia movements in particular.  In some varieties, it tends to be a kind of “farm crisis” or “agrarian reform” theory frequently used by those who study the Latin American context.  The second theory is called resource mobilization theory, and it suggests that states which are more prosperous and socially integrated would tend to develop more domestic terrorist activity, on the basis that group competition for power and resources becomes intense.  The third group of theories are called cultural theories, and propose that states experiencing greater cultural diversity and female empowerment along with increasing paramilitarism are likely to develop greater levels of domestic terrorist activity.  In terms of research findings, more empirical support seems to exist for the third set of theories (at least according to Freilich 2003), although resource mobilization theory tends to dominate the theoretical literature (see Jenkins 1983 for the definitive list of resources such as money, organizational facilities, manpower, means of communication, legitimacy, loyalty, authority, moral commitment, and solidarity).  Also in general, there is more empirical support for the idea that domestic terrorism more often plagues richer and affluent nations than poor ones.

    Briefly, resource mobilization theory describes the process by which a group assembles material and non-material resources and places them under collective control for the explicit purpose of pursuing a group’s interests through collective action.  Collecting resources must be accompanied by mobilization of resources.  A group may prosper yet still not contend for power.  Four central factors condition the process of mobilization: organization, leadership, political opportunity and the nature of political institutions.  Strong horizontal links between members of a group provide the best organizational structure.  Leaders who make themselves available to members and take an interest in members’ grievances tend to make the best leaders.  Political opportunities refer to moments when the “time is ripe” for action, and groups which seize upon such opportunities tend to succeed.  Political institutions refer to moments when the existing political parties are weak or fractured, and these are seen as times when domestic terrorist groups will best succeed by taking action.

Anarchy Archives Research Center on History and Theory of Anarchism
Anarchosyndicalism by Rudolf Rocker
Are Terrorists Psychotic or Psychopathic?
Islamism, Fascism, and Terrorism
Peter Kropotkin’s 1910 Encyclopedia Article
Psychological Qualities of Machiavellianism
Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Model
Review of Latest Books on Terrorism
Talking to Your Kids about Fascism
Terrorism as Fascism’s Most Loyal Helpmate in Ending Democracy
Terrorism and Political Violence: A Bibliography
The Anarchist FAQ Webpage
The Emma Goldman Papers
The New Evil of Islamo-Fascism
The Psychology of Terrorism: Mind of a Terrorist
The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism [HTML Exec. Summary]
Understanding Evil: The Psychology of Terrorism

Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why (pdf)

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Last updated: Jan. 19, 2014
Not an official webpage of APSU, copyright restrictions apply, see Megalinks in Criminal Justice
O’Connor, T.  (2014). “Theories of Terrorism,” MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. Retrieved from



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